Putting the "Up" in Bottom-up Peacebuilding: Broadening the Concept of Peace Negotiations

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Abstract. A new theory of how nations negotiate is described wherein peoples negotiate, not just political leaders, and the negotiations of the latter are affected by the former. We draw on theories and concepts from Track Two diplomacy, citizen peacebuilding, civic democratization, and social movements to develop an integrated theory of how peoples negotiate. That is, we demonstrate how citizen peacebuilders create the democratic, social, cultural and human capital necessary to effectively engage national level politics by first building peace and democracy at the grassroots and in *local* politics. Further, we describe the development of a "peacebuilding organism" involving specialized citizen peacebuilding organizations that coordinate to produce mutually reinforcing growth toward peace and democracy at all levels of society. This gives peace a deep-rooted momentum that transforms political resistance. This theory is applied to explain peace movement development in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We close by considering implications of this theory for optimizing international assistance.

Keywords: Peacebuilding, negotiation, nongovernmental organizations, democratization, social movements, political culture, track-two diplomacy, peacebuilding organism, Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina

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I like to believe that people in the long run are going to do more to promote peace than our governments. Indeed, I think that people want peace so much that one of these days governments had better get out of the way and let them have it – Dwight D. Eisenhower

Introduction

The negotiation of peace agreements and their implementation commonly involves undemocratic or newly democratizing societies. Given the Western policy consensus on democratization as a prescription for peace in the post-cold war era, it is important to consider *how* democratization can prompt and improve the negotiation of official agreements and the ongoing negotiation necessary for their consolidation (and how it might not).

The study of peace negotiations is dominated by a relatively simple, socially disembodied model of negotiation, focused on formal negotiation between high-level political or military leaders. Its interaction with other kinds of peace negotiations at other levels of society is understudied, especially the role of democracy in linking these levels. Furthermore, the dynamic role of democratization in *improving* the linkage of civic and political peace negotiation has been relatively ignored in the literature. We endeavor to correct this by analyzing the process by which citizen peacebuilders can influence top-level negotiations through promoting peace and democratization at the civic level and lower levels of politics.

In essence, negotiation is a creative activity in which the parties involved discover information about each other's needs and interests and come to common decisions on some issue or set of issues. As such, it perfuses social relations, from a customer haggling with a street vendor, to the collective development of a new cultural attitude (racial equality, for example) through millions of confrontations and exchanges among the populace. Accordingly, negotiation textbooks commonly begin with comments about the generality of negotiation: "Negotiations take place at various levels – among individuals, groups, and states" (Kimura 1999: ix); "Around the world, people negotiate: It is the only way to make collective decisions when there must be unanimity and there is no decision rule" (Zartman 1999: 1). It is also common to acknowledge the complexity of negotiation, as Rubin and Brown (1975: 2) tell us: "Negotiation . . . seems to be used primarily in connection with interaction involving complex social units (e.g. unions, nations, etc.), and, usually, multiple issues."

Yet the mainstream negotiations literature (the social-psychological and game-theoretic views) has tended to simplify the topic in analysis. Pruitt



Figure 1. Typical model of negotiation, with context as given

(1981: 1) is representative: "Though negotiation often involves multiple parties, this book will focus exclusively on the two-party (dyadic) case. This case is more theoretically accessible and is the subject of vastly more empirical research than the multiparty case." The focus of analysis has been on dyadic negotiations between representatives of large collectives, rather than negotiations between whole societies or social groups, involving networks of many actors. The tendency has also been to see negotiations as isolated strategic events, rather than manifestations of ongoing networks of relationships and social processes.

Other parties who affect those seen as the principal negotiators are often disregarded or generally referred to as "context" or "situation" and usually seen as static or uncontrollable (see Figure 1). A prominent but partial exception is the two-level game pioneered by Putnam (Evans et al. 1993; Putnam 1988), concerning the interaction of domestic politics and international bargaining, but even this takes a static view of the level of democracy in a country, rather than addressing how non-democratic domestic politics can be transformed to support peace better. Zartman's (1989) concept of "ripeness" for negotiation is contextual or external, but limited to the happenstance of a "hurting stalemate" on the battlefield (though it has acquired, in usage, a broader meaning of general public support for peace).

We propose a different perspective. In democratic or democratizing societies, what has been called context is actually negotiation. The "context" for official negotiations is dynamic and negotiable, and contains civic agents of change. This adds considerable complexity, but opens new possibilities for *creating* ripeness and transforming intractable conflicts. As democratization proceeds, citizens are increasingly able to negotiate peaceful relations among

themselves directly, and to affect official negotiations by changing the political context in which they occur. They do this not simply as individuals, but more effectively through associations in which they come to express common attitudes and understandings, hone relevant skills, pool their resources, coordinate their actions and demonstrate their unified numbers. Democratization, in turn, is itself negotiable and brought about in large part by civic associations.

In societies which need to build peace and democracy at the same time, citizen peacebuilding associations thus can contribute to the negotiation of peace not only directly at the grassroots or by interacting with those politicians who happen to be accessible to them, but also by working to open the democratic space for civic action to build peace, both directly and through politicians. In this article, we will explore theoretically how the processes of citizen peacebuilding and civic democratization can develop in tandem, to change the sociopolitical environment in which official peace negotiations and implementation occur.

We will begin with an overview of the literature on Track Two diplomacy and citizen peacebuilding, showing how it neglects the interaction of peacebuilding with democratization. This is followed by a review of the literature on the development of civil society and democratic political culture, with an eye toward the ways in which citizen peacebuilding associations are affected by and can contribute to democratization. We then consider these associations as social movements, reviewing relevant concepts from the social movement literature that illuminate the challenges facing citizen peacebuilders as they become increasingly politically ambitious. A combined theory is woven from these threads delineating the process whereby citizen peacebuilding associations in democratizing societies can develop into what we call a "peacebuilding organism" of networked specialized organizations engaging not only private citizens, but media, local and national political leaders, and other influential target groups. We apply this theory to understanding the current state of citizen peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We expect that peacebuilding is most effective and sustainable when a wide selection of citizens from each side of a conflict becomes active in creating their own peace on many levels and in many locales. When we refer to "citizen peacebuilders" or their organizations, we therefore principally have in mind people from the conflicting society or societies, rather than outsiders. Yet, both citizen and official peacebuilders from other societies can play a constructive role in bringing new ideas or skills to local citizen peacebuilders, by helping locals obtain resources, by lending prestige through association, or by helping to organize international political pressure where helpful. We therefore close by considering implications of our theory for optimizing international assistance to citizen peacebuilding.

Track Two Diplomacy

The body of literature on Track Two diplomacy explicitly focuses on how official peace negotiations between conflicting nations (Track One) can be aided by unofficial efforts led by citizens (Track Two). Yet it does not consider how democracy and democratization affect such efforts. Montville (1987: 7) coined the term "Track Two," defining it as "unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations which aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict." There have been many Track Two efforts with important impacts on official actions, including between the United States and USSR, in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, South Africa, Georgia/Abkhazia, and Mozambique (Gidron et al. 2002; Hume 1994; McDonald 2002; Nan 2004).

In official and public negotiations, Montville (1987: 7) points out, political leaders need to be seen as "strong, wary and indomitable in the face of the enemy." In intense conflicts, the enemy is usually dehumanized, and the public may reject as a traitor anyone making concessions or even contact with the other side. Track Two diplomacy escapes this by working with political leaders, or those who can influence them, unofficially and in private. A facilitator leads them through a process of improving interpersonal relations, improving understanding of how the other side sees the conflict, and developing "joint strategies for dealing with the problem as a *shared* problem" (Montville 1987: 7). Furthermore, Montville theorizes that Track Two diplomacy can influence public opinion to create a more favorable political environment or even pressure for officials to pursue peace in Track One negotiations, or to prepare the public for peace implementation. Thus, Track Two diplomacy theoretically changes the "context" of official negotiation both by providing a process (i.e. an additional channel of informal communication) and by affecting public opinion directly (see Figure 2).

Track Two diplomacy acts on a relationship-building model which differs from competitive, power-based, or zero-sum negotiation. Like the concept of mediation, which has become popular in the United States at the interpersonal and community level as an alternative to the courts, the "outcome" of Track Two is a transformed relationship between the parties rather than simply solutions of particular issues. This is important, in part because it ideally empowers the parties to continue solving future problems themselves, and to avoid dependence on intervention by third parties. The informal setting helps the parties learn more about each other as individuals and fellow sufferers, to re-humanize the other, and in the process learn about the culture, psychology, structures, and key underlying interests of the other side. Stereotypes and



Figure 2. Track Two diplomacy model

misperceptions are corrected, and each side learns how to couch its communication in terms that resonate positively with the culture and interests of the other side. The process also focuses on creative joint problem-solving seeking win-win solutions. Trust is built in small steps between the participants, which make possible successively more open and creative interaction, sometimes leading to results which were previously inconceivable to the parties. Trust often reaches the level of friendship among participants.[1]

When applying this relationship-building method to a societal conflict, however, there is generally a "reentry problem" – how to make others who are still embroiled in the conflict and have not had this experience understand and accept this transformation. This can either hamper Track Two effects or be the impetus for former participants to involve those they know in the process. Track Two ultimately depends on (1) reaching those powerful enough to impose peace on society and/or those persuasive enough to lead the society to peace, or (2) spreading to so many citizens as to create such a critical mass of support for peace that most leaders and other citizens join the bandwagon.

How the level of democracy in a society affects the ability of Track-Two diplomacy to influence politicians or the public is not well theorized or often studied, though the sensitivity of politicians to public opinion is clearly a matter of democracy. Unofficial actors will be more effective at engaging both politicians and the public in a democracy (for reasons we elaborate in more detail below). For instance, Saunders' original (1987) discussion of how Track

Two affects Track One ignores how these mechanisms are constrained in a less democratic society, where leaders do not communicate their doubts, policy circles are small and insular with less free-ranging discussion, public pressure is more difficult to generate and less effective at influencing policy, and democratic rights of ordinary citizens to free speech and free association are not protected. Saunders' more recent work (1999: 51–67) does note the need to develop a participatory public with a mature understanding of its role in holding politicians accountable, as well as "interlocking networks" of associations through which citizens build social capital for cooperative action over "a long time," but states "a neat strategy for building civil society has not been worked out." Likewise, Fitzduff and Church (2004) sum up an edited volume on NGOs influencing policy in conflict areas without addressing how their insightful recommendations might be adjusted to the level of democracy, or how Track Two might contribute to democratization. There are some reports, however, of official actors repressing, manipulating, or ignoring Track Two efforts (Bolling 1987: 56–7), which one would expect is more likely in less democratic contexts. Officials may see Track Two as a threat, because they are unaccustomed to civic action, or they benefit from the state of conflict, or both. If they tolerate it, it may be merely to please international powers pressing them to do so. For example, inattention, repression and manipulation have plagued Track Two efforts in Cyprus, though there has been some movement towards cooperation of officials (Economidou 2000; Oztoprak 2000; Turk 2000). But this literature has not effectively explored strategies for handling or changing this state of affairs.

It is often mentioned that elite participants in a particular Track Two effort have had some special relationship with government officials (Fitzduff and Church 2004: 171) or were themselves officials participating unofficially (Nan 2004). These may be politically connected academics, businesspeople, religious leaders, local politicians, political advisors, senior bureaucrats, or retired high-level officials (McDonald 2002). Such elite connections may be the key to influence in the short term in less democratic societies, where barriers to building effective public pressure are strong. Yet, it may be more difficult to recruit such elites in less democratic societies, as there are fewer channels of influence, which are less public, elites have less independence, and contact with the other side is more risky for them. Furthermore, relying entirely on such channels in the longer term may reinforce anti-democratic traditions of patronage and a policy-making process that is insulated from the people.

The influence of Track Two diplomacy through public opinion, while theorized, is not well demonstrated in practice. Whether this results from the difficulty of producing such an effect in less democratic contexts or the expense and difficulty of measuring it is unclear.

Citizen Peacebuilding

Track Two diplomacy is a subset of a larger concept of citizen peacebuilding which encompasses civic action beyond that focused on affecting Track One. Literature on citizen peacebuilding has noted problems with the level of democracy, but has not adequately explored interaction with democratization. The "peacebuilding" concept was introduced by Boutros-Ghali (1995: 61–2) as an effort to "consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people" by "sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems." He does explicitly link peacebuilding to democratization (including "promoting formal and informal processes of political participation"), asserting "there is an obvious connection between democratic processes – such as rule of law and transparency in decision making – and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order." It may occur both prior to official peace agreements, making them possible, and in the implementation of them.

McDonald and Diamond (Diamond and McDonald 1996; McDonald 2002: 55–57) have accordingly expanded the Track Two concept to "Multi-Track diplomacy" to account for other tracks of citizen peacebuilding, including citizen exchange, business, media, religion, education/training, peace activism and funding, each of which involves myriad negotiations among citizens and between citizens and leaders at various levels to relieve pressures reinforcing conflict and build peaceful relationships. They de-emphasize facilitating progress in Track One, and treat all tracks as equally important parts of a peacebuilding *system*. Success in track one, in other words, will fail in implementation unless there is parallel progress in the other areas.

Similarly, Bloomfield's (1997) examination of peacebuilding in Northern Ireland has developed the idea of "complementarity" between political agreements and civic attitudes: Progress in one potentiates progress in the other, and the impact of either is limited by a lack of progress in the other. He finds that officials, who tend to focus on "structural" issues, such as the constitutional issues of Northern Ireland, increasingly recognized the dependence of any political solution on changing attitudes among the populace. Furthermore, civic activists involved in such a "cultural" approach increasingly saw the need to support progress at the political level. This growing interaction over three decades helped make the Good Friday peace agreement possible. A similar complementarity can be seen between citizen peacebuilding and official peacemaking in Israel/Palestine (Golan and Kamal 2000).

The concept of "bottom-up" peacebuilding has been popularized by Lederach (1997), who argues that long-term grassroots peacebuilding is not only necessary for sustainable peace, but may be the starting point when

official leaders are stuck in intransigent conflicting stances. Like Montville, Lederach argues that politicians may have difficulty moving toward peace without public support, but adds that leaders who benefit from conflict are likely to be insensitive to the opinion of the populace anyway. Furthermore, in intra-state conflicts, top-level negotiations may be troubled by the lack of an easily identified and accessible negotiating partner who has sufficient control to guarantee that a top-level negotiated agreement will be implemented. Lederach's notion of bottom-up peacebuilding focuses on empowering ordinary people and community leaders to rid themselves of violence and its effects by cooperatively meeting their basic needs, transforming their relationships, and building better ways of managing conflict at the community level – all involving civic negotiation. This creates a more favorable environment for top-level leaders to come to a peace agreement and reduces their ability to maintain violence. He recognizes, however, that advocacy for peace from ordinary citizens is likely to fall on deaf ears in undemocratic societies, or may generate repression.

Lederach accordingly suggests a "middle-out" approach in which peace-oriented mid-level social and political leaders are supported in working both with their publics and with higher levels of leaders to build peace. Lederach sees mid-level leaders as essential to "integrating" peacebuilding at civic and political levels. These leaders have the localized cultural clout and sensitivity to be effective with their publics, while at the same time possessing access to high-level leaders and often links to each other. This is similar to the Track Two approach of engaging elites with existing links to policy-makers, but adds that those with existing grassroots links are also strategically important. Mid-level leaders may be less invested in the conflict than higher leaders, while also less preoccupied with satisfying basic needs than ordinary citizens, and thus in a better position to engage in peacebuilding. Lederach (1997: 95) adds that "recognition by the international community of these persons as valid and pivotal actors for peace is necessary to legitimate the space they need." We add that mid-level leaders can be both gatekeepers who select the information that reaches their superiors, and links upon whom top-level leaders depend to implement policy (providing powers to interpret or selectively implement policy, and leverage to negotiate). They are also potential future top-level leaders.

Figure 3 shows a citizen peacebuilding model of negotiation, wherein there are important outcomes at the interpersonal and local levels as well as the national level, and these outcomes are interactive, as are actors at each level. This figure omits the "process" element for simplicity, but, like Track Two, transformed relationships would be part of the outcomes. Note that at least three different classes of peacebuilding organizations would be involved,



Figure 3. Citizen peacebuilding model, with outcomes at all levels

specializing in different levels of intervention. Given this complex web of activity, Lederach (1997: 99–106) points to the need for loose coordinative structures such as a directory of peacebuilding organizations, peace donor conferences, and communication "channels" between top and middle levels, between different kinds of resources, and between international and local peacebuilders.

Lederach (1997) furthermore emphasizes the need for integration of peacebuilding across time, as well as levels of society – with planning of programs at the decade level providing a crucial link between short-term crisis intervention and long-term systemic and generational change addressing root causes of violence. He suggests a rule of thumb that it will likely "take as long to get out of an armed conflict as it took to get in" (1997: 78). He (1995) also urges less reliance on culturally "prescriptive" methods in favor of "elicitive" methods that find and nurture culturally indigenous resources for conflict transformation.

Corroborative empirical study of hundreds of citizen peacebuilding organizations by the Reflecting on Peace Practices (RPP) project led by Anderson

(2003) has demonstrated the critical importance of linking "individual" (interpersonal) and "socio-political" (institutional) levels of peacebuilding, either within projects or by linking projects of organizations who specialize at different levels. Furthermore, it emphasizes the need to link strategies and projects that target large numbers of people and those that target smaller numbers of strategically important "key" people. Among such key people are "hard-to-reach" people who might otherwise be spoilers (such as paramilitaries) or those who can provide influence over sectors of the population (like Lederach's mid-level leaders). This research also emphasizes the importance of supporting indigenous peacebuilding initiatives and basing interventions on analysis by insiders to the conflict zone. It suggests that insiders should have the greater influence in collaborative relationships with outsiders.

There is an unresolved tension in both Lederach and RPP between admonitions to draw solutions from within local cultures and the need for cultural change where there is little democratic tradition, hence to build more democratic relationships between officials and citizens. This is reflected in tension between domestic and international peacebuilders. If citizen peacebuilders and officials have little interaction, is this a sign that a more prescriptive international intervention is required to overcome undemocratic attitudes and traditions? Or do the local citizen peacebuilders know best what needs to be done and when – for example that political engagement must come after some other steps, given the existing stage of conflict, level of democracy, and status of peacebuilding organizations? Exploring how democratization and peacebuilding can interact will help to answer questions of when and how local citizen peacebuilders should foster cultural change, and when and how international peacebuilders should assist them.

Civic Democratization

Peace agreements, especially since the end of the cold war, tend to establish new democratic institutions, often where there is little or no history of democratic government, especially at the central level. These are usually carefully designed to promote power-sharing and compromise among the warring parties, but struggle to succeed, especially in early years. The design of new institutions can have very important impacts on peacebuilding, but is in a sense the easy part of democratization; making them work as intended can be a much longer and more difficult process. In Bosnia, for instance, the new parliament crafted by the Dayton peace agreement was so obstructed by nationalist parties that it was unable to pass any significant legislation for years after its creation (International Crisis Group 2003). Snyder (2000) has elaborated how

institutional democratization without co-requisite civic democratization can lead to a renewal of ethnic conflict rather than peace.[2] To work properly, democratic institutions require a civic context of certain kinds of human, social, and cultural capital which enable citizens' interests to be expressed, heard, balanced, and reasonably well followed. Citizen peacebuilders usually have little initial impact on institutional design, but can play an important role in the lengthy process of building the needed civic context for those institutions.

As several prominent scholars of institutional design have acknowledged, democratic institutions ultimately depend on democratic political culture in order to peacefully and effectively manage conflict (Lijphart 1999: 172, 306; Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 235). Though new democratic institutions may, over time, help develop such a culture, initial malfunctions may instead lead to failure of the institutions and a return to despotism or warfare.

What is democratic political culture? We can begin by defining "culture" as a system of shared values, beliefs, orientations, social structures, traditions, and symbols that give meaning to natural and social phenomena and guide (but do not determine) the thoughts, emotions, and actions of individuals within a cultural group. Culture is also a process that is not static and is affected by individual experiences (Avruch 1998). Then "democratic political culture" is a system and process of cultural elements that influence how citizens and politicians think of themselves, each other, and government, and how they might conduct politics in a democracy. It reinforces the formal rules established by the democratic institutions and fills in with relevant cognitive and emotive structures and norms of behavior where those rules are silent. Building such culture involves myriad negotiations throughout society to agree on new ways of thinking, feeling, and acting.

In a seminal comparative study of political culture, Almond and Verba (1989/1963) defined a "civic culture" which they viewed as best for democracy. In this culture, citizens see themselves as legitimate participants in political decision-making, at national and local levels. They identify with the national institutions, but not merely as obedient subjects. Almond and Verba suggest democratic participation is built upon "civic competence" comprising these attitudes as well as civic knowledge and skills, and is tempered by an overarching sense of common identity and habits of trust and cooperation. This is consistent with liberal civil society theory, which additionally specifies tolerance, equality, civility, compromise, and rule of law as essential democratic values and habits (Bryant 1995; Hall 1995).

Tocqueville (1969/1850) theorized that associations and *local* government are the schools in which citizens learn democratic political culture, because citizens are more readily engaged in these smaller decision-making structures close to home. Almond and Verba confirm that members of associations are

more confident of their ability to affect political decisions, engage in more political discussions, and have opinions on more political issues, independent of education. These effects increase with level of associational involvement, and are stronger in politically engaged associations. They also show that citizens feel more competent in local politics than national, and this is particularly true in less democratic societies (which supports Lederach's strategy of engaging mid-level leaders before national leaders). Political self-confidence is associated with taking political action, and doing so by organizing others. Thus, associations engaged in local politics are ideal schools of democracy.

Studies of civic education in democratizing societies indicate that such immediate real-world arenas for practicing the lessons taught in civics classrooms are crucial for developing sustained practice (Carothers 1999: 231–35). As Tocqueville also observed, responsible media are also essential to reinforcing democratic values and ways of thinking, as well as informing citizens of various perspectives on political issues (especially newspapers – see Putnam 2000: 218–20), and diverse associations help ensure the diversity of media, which is the antidote to media inflaming passions (see Snyder 2000). Accordingly, a critical role citizen peacebuilding organizations can play is to develop democratic thinking and traditions among politicians, the media, and the public, which contribute to the ability of the people to negotiate with politicians for peace.

Eckstein (1998) argues that internally democratic associations are better at building democratic political culture. Putnam (1993) has accordingly shown that communities with broad networks of associations based on equality of members are responsible for higher generalized trust and better governmental performance in northern versus southern Italy. Citizen peacebuilding organizations can thus contribute to democratization by, for example, electing their officers, operating transparently, and consulting members or the public on goals and methods. While internal democracy can slow down and complicate decision-making, civic organizations need not dramatically sacrifice democracy to efficiency, and can usually operate quite well with executives held regularly accountable to membership or representative boards. Constructing many specialized organizations that cooperate, rather than monolithic organizations, may aid this, as smaller organizations provide more intimate venues for member participation and limit the need for hierarchy. Additionally, members of democratic organizations will be freer, and perhaps more empowered to connect through a greater variety of associations with other civic organizations.

Interethnic tolerance and trust are aspects of democratic political culture that are enhanced by associations with ethnic diversity in their structures and activities (e.g. Putnam's [2000: 22–4] "bridging social capital"). Ideal contact

theory shows that cooperating on joint goals with the approval of authority figures under conditions of equality is ideal for overcoming stereotypes and reducing prejudice (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). Associations can produce these conditions by building stature in their communities (thus having the "authority" to engage in interethnic contact), and by engaging ethnic groups in cooperation through the association's activities and decision-making structures. Such interethnic interaction is more effective at reducing prejudice when associations engage more than token proportions of ethnic groups (Hemmer 2003). Where different cultures are involved, it can also improve intercultural sensitivity (including to negotiation styles) and communication. Democratic norms and procedures within the association should help to condition interethnic interaction on equality, and provide a training ground for peaceful multiethnic political negotiations.

In addition to cultural values, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) show that political participation of individuals depends on education, income, free time, civic skills, interest, information, and mobilization. Associations help mobilize citizens, as well as provide information and build interest and civic skills, compensating to some degree for lower education and income. Citizen peacebuilding associations can play all these roles in building an effective peace constituency, which is essential in areas that are underdeveloped in terms of human and social capital as well as democratic political culture.

All this takes time. International agencies engaging in civil society development tend to rush political engagement, trying to transplant the model of national advocacy groups found in established democracies without sufficient prior attention to the nurseries of democratic political culture and civic skills – that is, internally diverse and democratic community associations and local politics. The results are elite organizations, disconnected from the grassroots and thus ineffective and unsustainable (Carothers 1999). Effective civic development starts locally and is driven indigenously. It takes time and effort to build the democratic cultural, social, and human capital necessary for effective political engagement at the national level.

Social Movements

As citizen peacebuilding becomes politically engaged, it usually involves building social movements. Social movements are coalitions of individuals and/or associations which seek to change policy or culture, but lack ready influence over those in power. The basis of their influence is thus the number of citizens they can mobilize, engaging in tactics such as boycotts, demonstrations, petitions, letter-writing campaigns, or public discussions to gain

attention, sympathy, and changes for their causes. While originally conceived as operating in opposition to the state, they have also been conceived as striving to change cultural features by targeting cultural leaders or the public directly (Rochon 1998). Thus, a social movement might be built as a peace constituency that pressures politicians for peace, and/or as a movement to create (or recall) a more peaceful culture.

Social movements do not appear simply because a sector of a population has concerns that political institutions have neglected. Resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 1997) states that social movements are more likely to emerge when relevant resources such as cultural legitimacy, solidarity, organizational skills, financial resources, volunteers, information on the problem and proposed solution, and mass communication infrastructure are available. In addition to affecting whether a social movement mobilizes, the distribution of available resources structures what strategies and tactics are employed. These resources may be internal to the organization or aspects of the surrounding society on which the movement can draw. Resources rise for social movements as the discretionary resources (those not dedicated to basic needs) increase in the hands of people sympathetic to a movement's cause. In most democratizing countries suffering violent conflict, financial resources are scarce and are primarily held by those profiting from the conflict. So, peace movements depend heavily on international funding (Meyer 2002). However, the other types of resources must be developed locally over time, though this can be speeded somewhat by sufficient international funding.

Additionally, the political opportunity structure (POS), defined as the receptiveness of the political system to the change proposed by a social movement, can affect whether a social movement forms and how successful it is. McAdam (1996: 27) suggests the POS is more favorable when (1) there is instability in political alignments, (2) there are allies of the social movement among the political elite, (3) the will and capacity for repression is limited, and (4) political institutions are open to civic input (through many points of access, for instance). Less democratic institutions have less open POS and what shifts in POS may occur are more difficult to detect and exploit. Thus, starting a social movement requires a lead organization with a good sense of when the necessary resources are in place and the political opportunity structure is sufficiently open, as well as the ability to face the risks of repression and failure. In a democratizing society, such leaders are scarce, and NGOs with strong international ties may be most likely to have the training, information, advice, and security to do this. But it is usually important that the movement does not appear to be driven by foreigners.

Legitimacy in the eyes of the public, the media, and ultimately politicians is a key resource for social movements that aids them in attracting and

mobilizing adherents and resources, entering alliances, and gaining the attention of media and policy makers. Legitimacy can be accrued as a result of the movement's age, record of accomplishment, association with other movements, organizations or individuals which have legitimacy, and use of culturally resonant symbols, language, practices, and ideas (Gamson 1990/1975). Involving members or the public in democratic internal decision-making may also increase legitimacy, by virtue of the process and by being more in tune with popular interests.

In many cases, international organizations can aid local movements or organizations by lending them legitimacy by association, but only if the international organization is itself seen as legitimate in that situation. Otherwise, such association may backfire, making the local organization seem a stooge of foreign interests. Ties to international organizations can also give a local organization more influence through a "boomerang effect" wherein the local organization provides information to an international organization which pressures foreign governments to pressure the local government (Risse 2000). This helps compensate temporarily for democratic deficits, but there is a danger of creating dependency on it.

National social movements generally involve coalitions of organizations, as effectiveness at higher levels of politics requires greater numbers and skills. This is particularly important in democratizing societies where civic organizations are new and struggling to gain legitimacy. The coalition accumulates the legitimacy built by member organizations in their areas, to create a national legitimacy. Encompassing diverse organizations specializing in certain target groups or tactics gives a social movement more flexibility and influence (Staggenborg 1986). This is especially helpful in democratizing societies, given the limited pool of experience and other resources. The sensitivity of an issue may also argue for coalition, not only to gain specialized expertise that a coalition partner might bring to bear, but also to reduce the likelihood of repression and increase the ability to withstand it. However, coalitions also have costs for organizations, most notably in that they have an interest in differentiating themselves in order to compete for funds, members, and other resources (Rochon and Meyer 1997). There may also be negative effects on their own legitimacy through association with organizations identified with different motives, tactics, or social groups. The greater competition for resources and inter-organization suspicion in less democratic societies aggravates these costs of coalition.

Obtaining media coverage is a very important step for movements seeking to change policy, and especially to change culture. Gamson (1993) theorizes that movements are more likely to get their message into the media when they

have developed staff and resources able to respond to the needs of media in a way that gives them "standing" with the media. Additionally, because the media tend to focus on the sensational, protests and other dramatizations are helpful for gaining media attention, though such antics can detract from legitimacy and limit persuasive power with the public. Therefore, it is often helpful to form a loose alliance of protesting groups with more dignified "experts," often from academia, who can go on the media to explain and lend legitimacy to the movement's aims, as Rochon (1998) confirms in empirical analysis. There is still a danger of the message being lost or drastically simplified. As Snyder (2000) points out, in democratizing societies, media can be particularly irresponsible, exacerbating conflict in seeking sensational news and not checking facts, and some may even be hostile to peacebuilding (especially if beholden to nationalist political parties or ethnic organizations). This calls for extra care in choosing and handling media to cover the peacebuilder's efforts (Fitzduff and Church 2004), and the choices are often limited.

Often the key contribution movements make is to "reframe"[3] an issue or conflict in public discourse, in a way which makes it an urgent problem to solve, or shows a new way of resolving it (Snow et al. 1997). This can be done by re-emphasizing conceptual frames from existing culture that have lost salience, connecting or applying frames in new ways, or inventing new frames. Because even new frames must "resonate" with existing culture to be effective (as in Lederach's [1995] elicitive approach), we can speak of a *cultural* opportunity structure of peaceful or democratic frames in existing culture that can be amplified or connected to imported cultural elements. For instance, a national hero who had democratic ideals that have been forsaken could be recalled, or peaceful religious passages with widespread appeal could be invoked. It is helpful if these are elements of common culture among the conflicting parties, or at least if parallel elements from constituent cultures can be juxtaposed. Sometimes, international culture can be useful in this regard, such as the cultural appeal in Bosnia of being "European" (rather than "East European" or "Balkan"). Yet the higher the prevalence of indigenous democratic and peaceful frames, especially ones which resonate on all sides of the conflict, the easier it will be for peace and democracy movements to mobilize and be effective.[4] An analysis of peace movements in three societies (Gidron et al. 2002) has shown that reframing the conflict, rather than direct influence on policy,[5] is the principal peacebuilding contribution these movements have made.

Note that social movements inherently involve many negotiations. Coalition members negotiate with each other and their supporters on their goals, methods, resource commitments and roles. In turn, they negotiate with

the media and with political and cultural leaders, first for attention, and then for change in culture or policy.

The Process of Building a Democratic Peacebuilding Organism

The above review of the literature has revealed a number of key points regarding how citizen peacebuilding and civic democratization can interact as they evolve together. From these points emerges a theory of the process whereby citizen peacebuilding organizations can overcome the difficulties of operating in a democratizing society to affect peace negotiations at societal and political levels beyond the interpersonal level.

As we have seen, citizen peacebuilders face increased difficulties with engaging political issues and leaders in less democratic societies. Culturally, peacebuilders themselves may lack the orientation and confidence to engage political leaders or publicly engage sensitive issues, especially beyond the local level. Furthermore, the public, media, and politicians may have cultural difficulty accepting such a new role for a civic group, either ignoring it or viewing it with suspicion of desiring power for itself, or being a tool of foreign interests. Their organizations will likely lack needed resources such as civic skills, political knowledge, volunteers, and finances. While foreign aid can help alleviate these difficulties, the cultural, human, and social capital takes time to develop. Their ability to cooperate with similar organizations may be hampered by competition for funds, a paucity of nearby partners, uncertainty of the motivations and skills of potential partners, and general mistrust. Much of the media is likely unprofessional, sensational, and may even be hostile to peacebuilding. It is difficult to assess when a strategic opening has arrived for action with little transparency of government. And in addition to greater difficulty obtaining access to politicians, significant power may be in the hands of even less accessible players such as extremist militias. There is also increased risk that politicians or extremists will decide to oppress peacebuilders.

Citizen peacebuilders must respect the constraints of their political, cultural, and social environment, as well as their own organizational development, even as they promote change. Attempting too much change toward peace and democracy at one time will fail or backfire, so change must be conducted in judicious steps. Small steps can build confidence and trust which enable further steps. But, for citizen peacebuilders or democratizers, the entire political and cultural opportunity structure has to be incrementally opened, while their own skills, legitimacy, resources, and coalitions are simultaneously developed. Isolated changes are not likely to be effective on the overall conflict.

Manageable steps should be taken systematically, and ultimately simultaneously at several levels, with many types of actors, across the society. Change in each part of the social, cultural, and political fabric supports change elsewhere. Thus, the bulk of citizen peacebuilding/democratization work should be incremental, but broad.

This is not to say that there cannot be seemingly sudden developments of great significance, or that citizen peacebuilders play no role in bringing such developments about. Many have noted that political change can happen with rapidity, including Krasner (1984) and Collier and Collier (1991). However, fast change is fundamentally disruptive and often accompanied by violence. When political change happens swiftly *and* peacefully, this is more a sign that incremental peacebuilding has reached what others have called a critical mass (Rogers 2003), a tipping point (Gladwell 2002), or a stage of ripeness (Zartman 1989). What seems a sudden and huge step on the surface is often the result of long and patient peacebuilding and democratization work that is less dramatic and/or visible.

Such a peaceful societal transformation cannot be accomplished by a single peacebuilding organization or even by multiple – but isolated and uncoordinated – peacebuilding organizations. Instead, it requires what we can call a "peacebuilding organism" consisting of a broad network of peacebuilding organizations that (1) specialize in various types of activities, at the interpersonal, community, or national levels; (2) coordinate and cooperate to share information, and time and spread activities efficiently; and (3) pool resources and expertise as needed. Such organizations may specialize in working quietly or in public view, involving many participants or few participants. Their activities might include work with particular target groups, political influence through protest or lobbying, cultural influence through the arts, development of responsible and peace-friendly media, coordination of peace groups, peace foundations that raise and distribute funds, and peace research and training. Organizations sometimes profitably combine several of these (such as interpersonal and local politics), but rarely can master more than a few at a time. Just as the various organs of the human body cannot survive without each other, the peacebuilding organism requires a collection of specialized organs operating in concert to be successful. This does not imply a rigid hierarchical structure (which most NGOs would not tolerate), but a coordinated voluntary network focused on peacebuilding.

Citizen peacebuilding organizations usually begin as relatively small, marginalized, and powerless groups, but with ambitious goals. In situations of violent conflict, peacebuilding is often equated with treason, making it initially difficult to attract members. It thus requires strong ideals, and those who are attracted may be stronger on ideals than practicality. When these ideals differ

in visions of peace or how to get there, they become points of friction. Furthermore, peacebuilding organizations, like other civic organizations, are often dominated by a strong personality who founded the organization. Such people may have trouble being flexible and working with other strong personalities. Ironically, peace groups are not immune to the infighting which hinders the growth, merging, and cooperation of other kinds of organizations and movements. Yet, some grow larger than others, and over time effective organizations emerge that have found their philosophies and roles. The challenge, then, is to get them working together as a coordinated organism.

Most citizen peacebuilders will be ineffective if they begin by trying to affect negotiations at top levels, especially in settings with low levels of democracy. Exceptions are organizations that begin with members who have influence with elites connected to national policy making, or that have immediate legitimacy among elites due to association with a respected national or international institution (such as a university or church). If such organizations are ready when policy makers are receptive to new ideas due to an impasse, a shift in leadership or international pressure, they may get lucky. But this approach alone is insufficient. It depends entirely on elites providing opportunities for influence of their own accord or because of international pressure, and does nothing to prepare the public to accept, advocate, or sustain moves toward peace.

Conversely, citizen peacebuilders who shun overt politics completely and work solely at negotiating interpersonal peace may have a series of small successes. But, these alone will be ineffective at building peace in the larger society, and will be easily overwhelmed by ongoing events if politics remain in the hands of those who see profit in conflict. Yet, this is the easiest place to start, and small interpersonal successes help build credibility in the community and with donors, attracting members and resources. Activities at this level can also quietly contribute to democratic capital by promoting democratic political culture among participants, by building civic skills among members, and stimulating a network of trusting relationships with and among local citizens. Being internally diverse and democratic will improve the ability to serve as such a "school" of democracy and peace. While not immune to sparking repression, interpersonal activities are not as threatening to existing powers as overtly political activities. They can begin quietly in private spaces, slowly becoming more public as participants feel more confident, in steps small enough not to mobilize opposition. Interpersonal peacebuilding can ease into public view by taking the form of joint activity ostensibly focused on concrete humanitarian relief or development, which is frequently combined with peacebuilding (Gidron et al. 2002). This gives it the cover of a normatively sanctioned or less sensitive activity while also relieving stresses contributing to conflict and

building faith in the potential for civic cooperation. The broader the network of people who are made comfortable with contact with the other side and the possibility of citizen peacebuilding, the less the organization will have to worry about repression. Thus, interpersonal peacebuilding can lay a foundation for accelerating engagement in more politically ambitious activities.

Organizations that engage political leaders at the local level are a key development in the growth of the peacebuilding organism. Political negotiation at the local level is less demanding than at higher levels of politics. There are fewer actors involved, they are closer together, and citizens are more likely to believe they can be effective at this level. Furthermore, there are many topics with low levels of complexity and contention at the local level which peacebuilders can use to ease into political negotiation. This might begin, for instance, by inviting a local official to discuss a relatively innocuous problem such as frequency of garbage collection, at a community meeting that "happens" to involve citizens on either side of the main conflict who suffer this particular problem in common.

To access and influence local politicians successfully, especially where democracy is weak, it is very helpful to have built organizational legitimacy and networks in the community. Even undemocratic local politicians will take more interest in an organization with influence in the community (if nothing else as a potential rival power). The organization's ability to draw a crowd for an event may impress local politicians as at least an opportunity to pontificate (though the concept of listening may be new to them). Thus, having previously successfully engaged in less political activities, such as interpersonal peacebuilding or the delivery of social services for relief and development, is a good stepping stone to more openly engaging local politics. This is especially so if these activities win good will from local politicians by relieving strains on government resources.

Successful local political negotiation makes subsequent engagement on more sensitive issues or with higher levels of government easier and more effectual. Local political engagement enables peacebuilders to build legitimacy and even cooperative working relations with local politicians. Giving local politicians positive experiences with civic contact can help them transform in democratic directions. This helps them see that responsiveness builds popularity and a source of power independent of their higher-level bosses. It is also possible for some politically engaged peacebuilders to cross into political institutions by becoming staff of sympathetic politicians or even politicians themselves. This provides allies for the peace movement within the political establishment (though this may reinforce suspicions by the public that politically engaged civic activists are self-interested proto-politicians). Sympathetic local politicians can aid the organization in gaining access and

influence with politicians at the national level through party ties or other working relationships, or by themselves becoming national-level politicians. At the same time, the organization learns skills, gains experience and knowledge, and builds procedures and resources that can facilitate more ambitious political negotiations.

Local political engagement can also add to the organization's legitimacy with the local public, if it manages to dispel suspicions that its members are actually only looking out for themselves. The organization must succeed at negotiating improved responsiveness of local politics to provide some public good that is widely appreciated in the community. Using our earlier example, if the community meeting with the local official actually improved garbage collection, especially if it improved for all ethnic groups, this would demonstrate a positive role, help dispel suspicions, and build local legitimacy for further political engagement on more sensitive issues or at higher levels of government. Such success, especially if favorably reported in the media, can attract resources that make more ambitious projects possible. It can also attract other organizations as coalition partners needed for effective action on a larger political stage. It is particularly important that peacebuilding organizations build legitimacy for themselves, and for the political process, with the disadvantaged sectors of the population who are often the easiest recruits for those inciting violence.

This is not to say that all peacebuilding organizations should become politically engaged. There are advantages in specialization, and some organizations should remain involved primarily or solely in interpersonal peacebuilding. This is not only because interpersonal and politically engaged peacebuilding may draw on different skills or orientations, or lead to different organizational structures and resources. Being out of the political limelight enables quiet work on more sensitive topics, or with more fearful or vulnerable individuals, which would not otherwise be possible. Popular distaste or fear of politics, which can be quite strong in democratizing societies in conflict, can drive participants away from politically engaged organizations. Additionally, there are mid-level leaders other than politicians, such as religious leaders, teachers, journalists, influential artists, and paramilitary leaders, and it may be helpful for some organizations to specialize in dealing with them. As the RPP study suggests, it is important to reach broadly through the society, and a range of specialized organizations facilitates this. Furthermore, political engagement occurs at different levels of visibility and contention, and there can be advantages in not mixing them within the same organization, though coordination between specialized organizations may help them complement each other. Track Two efforts involving current officials as participants (a.k.a. Track One-

and-a-Half) are a form of political negotiation that happens out of the public view. These are in contrast to more public forms such as lobbying and, especially, protest.[6] It may be more difficult for organizations that conduct highly public campaigns to convince credibly officials that they can hold such secret events. Perhaps more importantly, organizations that are not engaged in contentious public campaigns are better placed to convince officials of their neutrality in such a mediation role.

Responsible media coverage becomes increasingly critical as peacebuilders become more politically engaged. The higher the level of political institution engaged, the more essential media access is for reaching the larger constituencies concerned, attracting allies, and building public pressure. The more sensitive the political issues taken on, the more essential it is for the media to be handled skillfully and the media to respond responsibly. Peacebuilders can begin building relations and experience with media locally on less sensitive issues before they venture into more ambitious projects. International assistance can clearly play a key role here, if timed appropriately. Peacebuilders need media-handling training as they become ready to engage the media, and parallel media development programs should aim to have responsible, professional national media available by the time peacebuilders are prepared to enter national politics. Peacebuilders can themselves contribute to developing media that are responsible in their reporting on conflict and peacebuilding, by participating in the development and implementation of media training, or even by developing their own media outlets or programs.

To be effective at higher levels of politics, peacebuilding organizations will need to form coalitions and operate as social movements. This will involve negotiating the movement's goals among organizations with different philosophies, tactics, and specializations, and overcoming competition for resources. Peacebuilding organizations would thus be wise to practice cooperation in less ambitious projects first. If a national movement is attempted at the wrong time, before sufficient resources, relationships, and political opportunity are in place, the resulting failure might discredit such activity and damage cooperation for some time.

The best case of a peacebuilding organism forming is Northern Ireland.[7] While under the rule of an advanced democracy, Northern Ireland long suffered a "democratic deficit." Civil society had little legitimacy when the "troubles" began with the violent suppression of a civil rights march in 1968. In the mid-'70s, the Peace People organized some demonstrations, but failed to engage the working class or articulate a clear vision, and their ineffectiveness resulted in the discrediting of political engagement (McCartney 2000). But more patient "community work" in working-class areas, with a primary

focus on socioeconomic issues but increasingly folding in peacebuilding aspects, succeeded in building legitimacy with the public and, eventually, local officials, gaining some policy influence by the 1980s (Fearon 2000; Gidron et al. 2002; McCartney 2000). In the 1980s, more explicitly peacebuilding-focused groups grew and became increasingly professional (Fearon 2000). In the 1990s, more openly political efforts emerged with the Initiative '92 series of public discussions – a coordinated national effort of many organizations (McCartney 2000). Peace Train then conducted a skilled media campaign successfully stopping train bombings, while others, such as the Quakers, continued to work quietly, allowing them to facilitate sensitive meetings between hardliners (Cochrane and Dunn 2002: 161–2). Intensified public discussions in the mid-'90s made it clear to politicians that the majority on both sides rejected intransigence. Additionally, citizen peacebuilders infused politics with a culture of inclusive and productive debate and aided the incorporation of paramilitaries into democratic politics. Some citizen peacebuilders even "brought the knowledge and skills they garnered from their work . . . to the negotiating process . . . and played a major role in the [Good Friday] political settlement reached on April 10, 1998" (Cochrane and Dunn 2002: 168–70). Having enough shared thinking and experience working together to be able to convene representatives quickly and take timely joint action, they then quickly organized a successful campaign across Northern Ireland to urge a "yes" vote on the referendum on the peace agreement, with veterans of the Initiative '92 effort at the core of this one. This campaign was critically important to the referendum's passage, as the pro-agreement political parties were lackluster in their support, while others were "vociferous" in campaigning against it (McCartney 2000: 6).

Increased acceptance by the government of this civic role in peacebuilding resulted in important increases in funding and training provided by its Community Relations Council in the 1990s, which explicitly began to "promote debate" and persuaded local councils, which previously tended to be sectarian, to support more intercommunity work in cooperation with citizen peacebuilders (Bloomfield 1997: 133–65; McCartney 2000). The European Union's European Peace Package, beginning in 1995, sizably increased funding for citizen peacebuilders (Fearon 2000). Importantly, decisions on how to spend it were made by "district partnership boards," involving NGOs alongside politicians, thereby providing increased NGO legitimacy, promoting interaction among these actors, and likely enabling more coordination and cooperation than the usual funding method of NGOs submitting isolated project proposals to an outside decision-maker.

While space does not allow presentation here, evidence shows that a peacebuilding organism of many highly networked specialized peacebuilding organ-

izations also contributed to a peaceful transition in South Africa, where promoting transformative contact of blacks and whites reframed Apartheid from "natural" to "unjust," thereby marrying the political influence and resources of whites to the black movement for democracy (Gidron et al. 2002; Taylor 2002). Further, there is evidence that citizen peacebuilders in Israel/Palestine have progressed from very quiet early activities to increasingly public activities, involving wider participation and increased political influence, though important segments remain unmoved and cooperation between organizations is underdeveloped (Golan and Kamal 2000; Gidron et al. 2002; Hassassian 2002; Hermann 2002).

Understanding Citizen Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Our theory sheds light on the state of citizen peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth "Bosnia" or "BiH"). Bosnia emerged from three years of brutal ethnic warfare between Serbs (Orthodox heritage), Croats (Catholic heritage) and Bošniaks (Muslim heritage) in November 1995. The war was the result of opportunistic politicians fanning the embers of past conflicts in order to gain power as post-communist Yugoslavia broke up. Limited media outlets under the control of nationalist politicians, limited civic traditions and structures, and economic distress all contributed to the tinderbox that became war (Denitch 1994; Hall 1994). Under the Dayton peace agreement, Bosnia was occupied by a NATO-led peacekeeping force, and violence was quickly reduced to rare and minor incidents. A complicated web of federal government was established, with governmental reform and functioning guided by a High Representative of the international guarantors of the peace, empowered to impose laws or remove politicians who obstruct reform and peacebuilding. Hundreds of international organizations entered Bosnia to aid reconstruction, de-mining, democratization, economic revitalization, return of refugees and displaced persons, and reconciliation.

Bosnia's troubled democracy has improved on the Freedom House scales, but remains no better than "partly free" after a decade of intense democratization efforts.[8] There has been much progress in building civic structures and attitudes, including an explosion of hundreds of civic associations. Nevertheless, most citizens still fear the day that the international community will leave them to govern themselves without close oversight, and they are just beginning to understand how democracy is supposed to function. The nationalist parties still dominate and the political structures still do not function very well. Furthermore, the economy remains troubled and a source of tension, as it struggles with simultaneous post-socialist and post-war transitions. Return

of displaced people or refugees to areas where they now form ethnic minorities has been occurring for some six years now, even including victims of severe "ethnic cleansing" in Srebrenica, though less than hoped (Mustafic 2004; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2005). In some areas, society is reintegrating fairly well, but in others, such as Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje, there is much segregation, including segregated classes in schools (Kirlic 2004). The peace is still superficial and fragile, and progress is slow.

In April-May 2004, the Center for Citizen Peacebuilding at the University of California, Irvine interviewed 29 citizen peacebuilding organizations in Bosnia regarding organizational traits and one peacebuilding project per organization conducted in 2003.[9] These organizations were geographically representative of the total of 60 NGOs that various sources informed us were likely to have relevant projects. All but three were local NGOs, though four retained strong ties to parent international NGOs, and three were just becoming independent. We explored a number of issues related to our theory, including the engagement of political leaders and politically sensitive issues, media relations, networking, and cooperating.

Strikingly, we discovered that nine years after the Dayton peace agreement, there was still no national peace movement or coalition. These organizations had no plan or structure in place for a national campaign to protect the peace from a resurgence of nationalism and violence once the international troops leave. Furthermore, the organizational leaders reported little cooperation with other peacebuilding organizations, due to competition for funding and suspicion of others being motivated principally by money. Two organizations interested in getting local religious leaders involved in peacebuilding were completely unaware of the three organizations specializing in inter-religious dialogue (Medic and Gagic 2004; Pjevalica 2004).

Only one organization, the Association of Citizens for Truth and Reconciliation, was politically engaged in 2003 at the national level on an explicitly peace-related project – lobbying for the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission (Finci 2004).[10] Several had, however, participated in a successful campaign beginning in 1999 to create conscientious observer status and a civil service alternative to military duty, but "were treated as traitors when we started" (Milicevic 2004). Most of the organizations are involved in peacebuilding solely at the interpersonal grassroots level, many with children. Only three felt their projects had influenced a law (at an intermediate level), and, while seven others felt they had at least increased cooperation with political leaders (all at the municipal level), the remaining 57 percent felt they had no direct effect on political leaders.

Yet 60 percent did have some sort of interaction with officials in imple-

menting community-building projects, though almost exclusively at the local level. Many organizations were involved in the sensitive matter of aiding the integration of minority returnees, and several reported very positive results to working with local politicians on this issue:

> *We have also found it helpful to involve local officials in speaking to citizens in support of our work – they are very influential, and give weight to what we are doing that promotes citizen involvement.* (Pjevalica 2004)

> *We had much better participation after we got the Mayor, who is SDA (Bošniak nationalist party), and the HDZ leader (Croat nationalist party) to come together to see our project.* (Topalovic 2004)

Also on the positive side, more than half of the projects had media coverage in 2003, which was generally positive. This is somewhat surprising, and perhaps a testament to media development efforts by various agencies, which sought to instill professional journalistic standards.

Small groups of organizations are cooperating, sometimes on projects spanning multiple cities, and a few of these are beginning to address openly sensitive issues. The Bosnian office of Quaker Social Peace and Witness is consulting with citizen peacebuilders throughout the region on the possibility of mounting a coordinated joint effort to finally begin public discussions on "dealing with the past" – that is, discussing why the war happened (Rakonjac and Bubalo 2004). Another cooperative project led by the Center for Nonviolent Action boldly televised panels of veterans from all sides discussing responsibility for war crimes (Hasanbegovic 2004). The three Bosnian Nansen Dialogue Centers held a conference in Mostar in May 1994 of Bosnian citizen peacebuilding organizations, resulting in a joint statement to political leaders.[11] Note, however, that the organizations taking on more politically ambitious projects tend to have strong international partnerships, suggesting that mentorship is helpful to this development. The Quakers, Center for Nonviolent Action, and Nansen Dialogue Centers are all managed by Bosnian staff who design their projects, but each is either part of an international organization or has strong ties to one that advises and funds it. One exception is the Tuzla Citizens' Forum, which is more purely a local NGO, but its political engagement is primarily with the municipal government of Tuzla (one of the most tolerant areas), though it has had some activity at higher levels.

Bosnia's citizen peacebuilders are not as politically engaged as we might hope after such intensive democratization efforts for nearly a decade. Yet, they are partially engaged, particularly at the local level. Our theory helps us understand why, as it predicts that political engagement in democratizing societies is more likely to begin at this level, after a period of working on less

political projects. There seems to be some movement towards greater cooperation between peacebuilders on projects engaging more sensitive issues and beyond local political structures. Again, this is consistent with our theory, which predicts that political engagement beyond the local level and on more sensitive issues will likely require coalitions.

At the same time, many complain of resources wasted on donor-driven projects, and difficulty in funding more needed projects and core expenses of organizational operation and development. Many feel that more needs to be done to deal with psycho-social trauma at the individual level in order to prevent future conflict and to change the culture away from group identity towards individual responsibility. But, international donors are paying far too little attention to these issues. Consider these quotes:

> *We need to start to talk about 1992 – why and how and who started the conflict. We have 3 stories, 3 truths. We need to go inside, accept things, and talk openly. The peace now is superficial. We are doing trauma work on integration of traumatic experiences, and establishing the internal structures allowing people to then rebuild external structures. Don't repress the past. This war is a result of WWII, and the conspiracy of silence which followed it. We can't finish the story because we don't have the beginning. We have a gap. The international community is rebuilding infrastructure, not investing in individuals. But peace has to start in individuals.* (Zecevic 2004)

> *A problem which needs to be overcome is collective thinking – people see what needs to be done, but still don't vote that way, due to collective thinking. As a result, politics currently do not represent what people really need. We need to build a new culture, a kind of thinking we never had before, where people follow personal interests instead. Major international agencies have not thought this through very thoroughly.* (Savija-Valha 2004)

We can take some comfort that political engagement of citizen peacebuilders seems to be growing, and a coordinated national peace movement may be on the verge of forming. Close relationships with long-term international mentors appear to be aiding this development. However, it is important not to neglect other aspects of the peacebuilding organism, and to listen to local peacebuilders who point to a continuing need to develop peace at the individual level. International sources of assistance should be responding to these locally identified needs even as they help local peacebuilders develop a politically engaged movement.

Conclusion

As we have shown, existing theories of peace negotiation, Track Two diplomacy, and peacebuilding inadequately consider the role of democracy and democratization. Peace negotiations happen at the grassroots and in local politics as well as national politics, and can involve building new democratic relationships between these levels. The lower levels are far more than a static context for national negotiations; rather, they are a dynamic source of cultural, social, and political change that can pull societies out of intractability at the top level. However, this requires the right developmental steps toward creating and nurturing a peacebuilding organism that effectively engages and links each of these levels. Combining theories of civic democratization and social movements with those of peacebuilding and Track Two diplomacy allows us to see how this can occur, with important implications for international intervention.

International support for citizen peacebuilding within a democratizing society can support its political engagement through funding, training, mentoring, and lending international legitimacy and political backing. However, if poorly conceived or timed, international assistance can also be harmful to effective political engagement. International aid organizations too often attempt to transplant concepts from advanced democracies to democratizing societies inappropriately or prematurely, when the necessary building blocks of democratic social, cultural, and human capital are not yet in place. The added complications of a society recovering from war while democratizing (and economically rebuilding) at the same time make such mistakes more likely and more dangerous. They furthermore tend to provide short-term funding for projects rather than long-term funding for a system of organizations, when the joint problem of peacebuilding and democratization is fundamentally long-term and requires a more nurturing and holistic approach. The result is a hodgepodge of organizations more in competition with each other than in cooperation, which in turn inhibits effective political engagement beyond the local level.

To promote effective citizen peacebuilding, international assistance needs to be targeted to the stage of democratic development, and focused on developing the necessary social, cultural, and human capital to rise to the next stage. Political engagement of citizen peacebuilders should be nurtured first at the community level, with organizations that have amassed some legitimacy in the community. Allowing local organizations to be the primary determinants of what projects and assistance are needed at what time and location is helpful to this end. Rather than simply supporting projects, or even organizations, in isolation, aid should be structured to provide long-term support to the development over time of a system of specialized peacebuilding organizations willing

and able to work together as the democratization process advances. The key may lie in something like the approach used by the European Union in Northern Ireland, designed to funnel assistance via local bodies that are in a better position to determine local needs appropriate to the stage of development, and to provide long-term nurturing and promote coordination and cooperation.

Notes

1. For example, see McDonald (2002); Oztoprak (2000); Saunders (1999); and Turk (2000).
2. Snyder and many others also emphasize that the success of democratization depends on economic development. This aspect is beyond our scope here, but is not unimportant. Peacebuilding can also play a role in association with economic development, as suggested by Montville (1987), Curle (1990) and others. Snyder additionally points to the importance of giving elites an interest in supporting the new institutions.
3. A frame, as presented by Snow et al. (1997), is an interpretive schema that enables one to notice, give meaning to, name, and place observations. Frames order the world and signal what actions should be taken.
4. For a historical examination of culture and peace movements, see Chatfield and Van den Dungen (1988).
5. However, demonstrating a direct effect on policy is notoriously difficult, as so many other actors exercise influence once an issue reaches political institutions.
6. Meyer (2002) finds that organizations involved in bridging conflicting groups avoid protest.
7. Please see a detailed explanation of the growth of the Northern Ireland Peacebuilding Organism at www.citizenpeacebuilding.org, under "publications."
8. See http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/
9. Details are at www.citizenpeacebuilding.org under "programs."
10. One other organization, the Center for Civic Initiatives (originally mentored by the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute), had many political initiatives at various levels, but not with a clear peacebuilding focus (Orhanovic 2004).
11. Details are at www.ndcmostar.org.

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